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Mads GraM Henriksen & Josef Parnas
EXPERIENCES WITHOUT FOR-ME-NESS? 
RECONSIDERING ALLEGED COUNTER EXAMPLES 
FROM PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND PSYCHEDELICS
taBle  oF CoNteNtS: 1. Introduction; 2. Selfhood and for-me-ness; 3. Alleged 
counter examples of for-me-ness; 4. Reconsidering these counter examples; 
5. Conclusion.
1. Introduction
In contemporary philosophical discussions of consciousness, a central question concerns whether for-me-ness (or the “minimal self”1) is a 
necessary feature of phenomenal consciousness. Over the years, Dan 
Zahavi has defended a position of “experiential minimalism”, arguing 
that phenomenal consciousness necessarily entails reflexive self-con-
sciousness in the sense that there is something it is like for me to have 
or live through experiences, thus considering “for-me-ness” a universal 
feature of phenomenal consciousness [Zahavi 1999; 2005; 2014; Zaha-
vi & Kriegel 2016]. Several authors have challenged this position by 
offering counter examples, i.e. by presenting examples of experiences, 
which, on their interpretation, lack for-me-ness [e.g., Metzinger 2003; 
Lane 2012; 2015; Billon 2013; Millière 2017].
The purpose of this article is to explore if such examples of experi-
ences really can be said to lack for-me-ness and thereby constitute via-
ble counter evidence, disproving the universality of for-me-ness. First, 
we introduce the concept of for-me-ness. Then, we present and discuss 
examples of experiences from the domains of psychopathology and psy-
chedelics that sometimes are claimed to lack for-me-ness.
1  In this article, we use the concepts of “minimal self” and “for-me-ness” inter-
changeably and synonymously [cf. Zahavi 2014; 2018]. 
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2. Selfhood and for-me-ness
In a famous passage from A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume describes 
how he tried to discover his own self through acts of introspection. Yet, 
the self was nowhere to be found, «I never can catch myself at any time 
without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception» 
[2007, 165]. Unable to find what he was searching for, Hume denied the 
existence of the self, «I am certain there is no such principle in me» [ibid.]. 
When reading this classic passage, one may be tempted to place Hume in 
a “no-self camp”, opposing it to a “self camp” where its members assert 
the existence of the self. However, such contradistinctions can easily be 
deceptive. Let us for example say that we want to use Hume’s “no-self” 
argument to challenge the phenomenological claim of the existence of the 
minimal self. Sooner or later, however, we would face difficulties, realiz-
ing that phenomenologists too deny that the self can appear as an object of 
experience that we can direct our attention towards. According to them, 
there is no “self-object”, populating consciousness. Eventually, we would 
have to draw a conclusion that would call into question the viability of our 
own analysis – the self, whose existence Hume denies, is not the same 
self as that which phenomenologists claim to exist. In other words, Hume 
and the phenomenologists operate with different concepts of the self. 
What Hume is arguing is that there is no “substantial” self in the sense 
of an unchanging, foundational entity that underlies the ever-changing 
flow of “perceptions”, which, on his account, consist of “impressions” 
and “ideas” [Hume 2007, 7]. Differently put, the self is not a “subiectum” 
in the metaphysical sense of the term. Phenomenologists agree; the self is 
not some “thing”, e.g., a hypothetical substrate or synthesizing principle, 
above or beneath the experiential stream. By contrast, what phenomenol-
ogists describe with the notion of minimal self (or for-me-ness) is a very 
specific feature of experiential life, namely that all experiences manifest 
first-personally to the subject of experience. Notably, Hume’s introspec-
tive search for his own self and his realization of the self-illusion were not 
experientially given to someone else but to himself in his own first-person 
perspective. In this regard, Hume’s denial of the existence of something 
like a substantial self has no bearings for the phenomenological claim of 
the existence of the minimal self – in fact, Hume’s introspective search 
presupposes the existence of the minimal self.
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Although phenomenologists argue that the minimal self cannot 
appear as an object, they do not consider it absent, unconscious or as 
some sort of pervasive “I-qualia”. Rather, they claim that the minimal 
self manifests itself pre-reflectively as a certain configuration of expe-
rience. For example, when I read a book, listen to a melody or taste an 
orange, I am implicitly (i.e. pre-reflectively) aware that I am the one 
who reads, listens or tastes. I do not need to reflect upon “who” it might 
be that is reading, listening or tasting in order to know that it is me. In 
other words, I am self-aware, not only when I introspect or reflect upon 
myself, but also simply in virtue of having experiences. Thus, it is not 
self-reflection that brings about self-awareness. Rather, as already Sar-
tre pointed out, «it is a non-reflective consciousness which renders the 
reflection possible» [2003, 9].
Now, the claim, rigorously defended in several seminal publications, 
is that phenomenal consciousness entails pre-reflective self-conscious-
ness in the sense that there is something it is like for me to have or live 
through experiences [Zahavi 1999; 2005; 2014]. As Zahavi and Kriegel 
[2016] put it, phenomenal consciousness entails a “what-it-is-like-for-
me-ness”. Here, “for-me-ness” articulates that experiences are first-per-
sonally manifest, i.e. they are always given to the subject of experience 
in a manner in which they are not given to anyone else. For example, 
the pain I experience is given to me in a manner that is fundamentally 
different from how you may experience my pain. Similarly, your expe-
rience of pain manifests to you in a way that is distinctly different from 
how I may experience your pain. The difference is precisely that one’s 
own experiences are first-personally present, i.e. there is an epistemic 
asymmetry at work here. Zahavi’s proposal has been to identify this 
ubiquitous, first-personal or subjective character of experience with for-
me-ness (or the minimal self), and he has argued that for-me-ness is a 
necessary feature of phenomenal consciousness.
3. Alleged counter examples of for-me-ness
The standard way to challenge universality claims is to come up with 
suitable counter examples. This strategy has also been applied in dis-
cussions on for-me-ness. Many authors have presented examples of ex-
exPerienceS Without for-me-neSS?
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periences, which they claim lack for-me-ness, thereby seemingly re-
butting the claim that for-me-ness is a necessary and universal feature 
of phenomenal consciousness. Some of these examples are found in 
psychopathology and altered states of consciousness during psychedelic 
intoxication.
Probably the most widely used example to challenge the univer-
sality of for-me-ness is thought insertion. Briefly put, thought insertion 
is a phenomenon in which patients experience some of their thoughts 
as not belonging to themselves, thereby ascribing the source of these 
thoughts to someone or something else. The delusional misattribution 
of certain thoughts to someone or something else may be vague or con-
crete, i.e. patients may experience alien thoughts in their own mind 
without knowing where these thoughts come from or they may believe 
that specific others or forces are the source of these thoughts [Henriksen 
et al., in press]. In discussions of self-consciousness, the phenomenon of 
thought insertion has attracted attention, because it seems to imply that 
mere awareness of one’s thoughts is not enough to secure recognition of 
these thoughts as one’s own.2 Many authors have argued that we must 
distinguish between different forms of experiential ownership, typical-
ly dividing it into a “sense of agency” and a “sense of ownership”. Sense 
of agency refers to a sense of being the initiator of, say, a thought or 
bodily movement, whereas sense of ownership refers to a sense of being 
the one who experiences, say, a thought or movement. Despite import-
ant differences in their accounts, many authors have argued that the 
sense of agency is lost but the sense of ownership retained in episodes of 
thought insertion [see, e.g., Stephens & Graham 1994; Gallagher 2004]. 
Since the sense of ownership is considered preserved on these accounts, 
the universality of for-me-ness is here not at stake.
Other authors, however, have offered more radical accounts of 
thought insertion that do in fact draw the universality of for-me-ness 
into question. Already in Being No One, Metzinger argued that pa-
tients experiencing thought insertion lack both the sense of agency 
and ownership [Metzinger 2003, 445]. Since the sense of ownership 
or the “phenomenal quality of mineness”, as he also calls it, is ab-
2 For a critical discussion of the use of thought insertion in philosophy of psychiatry, 
see Henriksen, Parnas, and Zahavi [in press].
10
sent in thought insertion, ownership cannot be a necessary feature 
of phenomenal consciousness [Metzinger 2003, 334]. Later, Lane 
[2012; 2015] made similar claims, arguing that thought insertion and 
other psychopathological phenomena constitute counter examples of 
for-me-ness. Additionally, Billon has also argued that thought inser-
tion results from a disorder of ownership rather than agency [Billon 
2013, 310]. If these accounts of thought insertion are correct, then 
they demonstrate the fallaciousness of the claim that phenomenal con-
sciousness necessarily entails for-me-ness.
Lane [2012] has also discussed another counter example of for-
me-ness that come from the domain of psychopathology. Ordinarily, 
he claims, self and consciousness seem «tightly interwoven», but some 
psychopathological cases enable us to see that ownership is in fact at-
tributed to mental states on the basis of a «second step» in which the 
subject infers that he or she is the subject of that particular state [Lane 
2012, 281, 257]. To substantiate his claim about this «second step», Lane 
refers to a case study by Zahn, Talazko, and Ebert [2008]. They report a 
story of a patient (D.P.), who after an incident on a long-distance flight, 
where he experienced an attack of tachycardia and dyspnoea accompa-
nied by the fear of asphyxiation, complained of «double visions». An 
examination revealed that D.P. did not see doubled objects in a literal 
sense. He described that he saw everything normally, yet his perception 
of objects had somehow changed in the sense that «he did not immedi-
ately recognize that he was the one who perceives and that he needed a 
second step to become aware that he himself was the one who perceives 
the object» [Zahn et al. 2008, 398; italics added]. This pertained to per-
ception of objects and not to perception of his own body or actions. A 
psychopathological examination found no other symptoms and a struc-
tured interview for DSM-IV-TR found that «the clinical picture did not 
fit to any specific psychiatric diagnosis» [ibid., 399]. D.P. was diagnosed 
with cognitive disorder NOS [ibid.]. Medical examination demonstrat-
ed abnormal functioning (hypometabolism) in inferior temporal, parie-
to-occipital, and precentral brain regions. Despite not finding other psy-
chopathological symptoms, treatment was initiated with different types 
of antidepressants and antipsychotics, as well as with memantine and 
recompression therapy in hyperbaric chamber (D.P. had been diving 10 
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days before the incidence on the plane). All treatment initiatives proved 
ineffective. According to Lane, D.P.’s need for a «second step» to make 
an inference from a perceived object to himself as the perceiver of that 
object is «sufficient to serve as a counter example to SS – perspective 
does not determine mineness» [Lane 2012, 258].3 On Lane’s account, 
first-personal givenness of experience does not secure for-me-ness, and 
he concludes: «Phenomenal consciousness does not entail self-aware-
ness; it is not stamped with a meish quality; and, for-me-ness does not 
play a determining role in its constitution» [ibid., 281].
Let us finally address another challenge to the universality of for-
me-ness. This one comes from recent research in psychedelics – a re-
search domain that has experienced a resurgence of scientific interest 
in the last decades [e.g., Carhart-Harris et al. 2014; 2016; Nichols 2016]. 
Following psychedelic intake, a manifold of altered states of conscious-
ness has been described, including experiences of ego-dissolution, fu-
sion with the surroundings or even of unity with the universe, unreal-
ity, and of being detached from one’s own mental processes or body. 
According to Millière [2017], psychoactive substances such as mesca-
line, psilocybin, and LSD can induce experiences of ego dissolution 
that disrupt both narrative and minimal aspects of selfhood.4 Though 
he suggests that more research is needed to settle this issue, he states, 
«the available data is consistent with the idea that the “sense of self” lost 
during DIED is not (or not merely) the narrative self, but the minimal 
self-awareness of ordinary experience rooted in sensorimotor process-
es» [Millière 2017, 11].5 To substantiate his claim, Millière draws atten-
tion to subjective reports of ego dissolution, arguing that «drug users 
are often reluctant to use the first-person pronoun at all when describing 
DIED» [Millière 2017, 14]. One drug user, which Millière quotes in this 
context, states: «There existed no one, not even me … so would it be 
proper to still speak of “I”, even as the notion of “I” seemed so palpa-
3  Lane uses “SS” as an abbreviation for “self-specificity” theories of consciousness 
to which group he includes experiential minimalism.
4  For a discussion of the distinction between minimal and narrative selfhood and the 
distinction’s applicability to psychopathological research, see Parnas & Henriksen 
[2019].
5  Millière uses the abbreviation “DIED” for “drug-induced ego dissolution”.
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bly illusory?» [ibid.]. Contrary to episodes of thought insertion, where 
Millière claims that «it still makes sense to say that I am aware of this 
thought, and indeed that I am aware of it as alien», the subjective reports 
of ego dissolution indicate, on his interpretation, that «they lack this 
first-personal aspect altogether» [ibid., 15]. In the end, Millière suggests 
that for-me-ness may be implicitly operative in ordinary conscious ex-
perience but it seems to break down in experiences of drug-induced ego 
dissolution. If this is the case, then experiences of ego dissolution also 
pose a challenge to the claim that for-me-ness is a necessary, irreducible 
feature of phenomenal consciousness.
4. Reconsidering these counter examples
How to best address these alleged counter examples? One initial reply 
to the claim by Metzinger, Lane, and Billon that episodes of thought 
insertion lack ownership or for-me-ness is to insist that patients with 
thought insertion experience that certain alien thoughts appear in their 
own stream of consciousness and not in somebody else’s stream of 
consciousness [e.g., Zahavi 2014, 39f.]. This is why the experience is 
so disturbing. By contrast, alien thoughts in alien minds are usually 
harmless [Zahavi 2005, 144]. Differently put, episodes of thought inser-
tion are still given first-personally to the experiencer, i.e. some sense of 
ownership or for-me-ness is retained even in these psychopathological 
experiences. If this was not the case, i.e. if the sense of ownership or for-
me-ness had effaced entirely, the experience of thought insertion could 
simply not articulate itself.
So why do Metzinger, Lane, and Billon insist that episodes of 
thought insertion lack ownership or for-me-ness? Without going into 
the details of their individual accounts, a part of the answer seems to be 
that they all embrace a literal reading of patients’ descriptions of their 
experiences. Billon claims that «patient’s reports should be taken at face 
value» [2013, 299] and he formulates what he calls a «phenomenological 
constraint» that theories of thought insertion must adhere to: «If the pa-
tient says that an occurrent thought is not his, then it is not subjective. If 
the patient says that an occurrent thought feels his, then it is subjective» 
[ibid.]. According to Billon, patients with thought insertion do not state 
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that the alien thoughts in some way are their own («They explicitly deny 
this!» [2013, 301]) and thus, following the phenomenological constraint, 
he concludes that episodes of thought insertion are not subjective and 
lack ownership. Although Lane offers a different account of thought in-
sertion, he seems to accept the legitimacy of the claim that patients’ re-
ports should be taken at face value, when he states that his own account 
also fulfils this constraint [2015, 116]. Finally, Metzinger argued that 
philosophical theories of mind should be able to incorporate the «ex-
istence denial», which patients with Cotard’s Syndrome may exhibit,6 
considering it an «important phenomenological constraint» [2003, 455]. 
Here, Metzinger too advocates a literal reading of patients’ reports and 
he even claims that these patients «truthfully» describe their experience 
of being dead or somehow nonexistent [2003, 456ff.]. In their effort to 
take the patients’ descriptions of their experiences seriously, the authors 
mistakenly take this to involve taking their descriptions literally.
So, why is a literal understanding of patients’ reports of psycho-
pathological phenomena problematic? First, mental terms are polysemic 
and what a patient means with a given term does not necessarily cor-
respond to these terms’ specific clinical meaning. Patients may report 
being “depressed” but when asked to clarify what they mean with the 
term or when prompted to provide examples of their experiences of be-
ing depressed, it may become evident that the experiences in question 
have nothing to do with clinical meaning of depression. For example, 
a patient may report longstanding feelings of being depressed. When 
asked to elaborate, he describes that he constantly struggles to under-
stand why human beings behave the way they do: why do they say “hel-
lo” to each other when they meet, why do they shake hands, why do 
they shake the right hand, etc. All the time, he ponders such basic ques-
tions, and this reflective burden exhausts him and leaves him fatigued 
[cf. Parnas & Henriksen 2014, 254]. Here, the patient’s experiences may 
be indicative of psychopathological phenomena such as problems with 
common sense and hyper-reflection; the experiences are not, however, 
suggestive of depression. Thus, clinicians cannot take patients’ reports 
at face value. By contrast, sincerely listening to patients and taking their 
6  Patients with Cotard’s Syndrome may report that they are dead, do not exist or have 
no internal organs [Berrios & Luque 1995].
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experiences seriously requires faithful exploration of the patients’ expe-
riences, their structure and quality, in the context of the patients’ other 
experiences, behaviour, and life history. This also applies to philoso-
phy of psychiatry. We cannot assume that what a patient meant with a 
specific statement in specific quote (e.g., that some thoughts are not his 
own) necessarily corresponds to a loss of certain features of phenom-
enal consciousness as they are defined in the philosophical literature 
(e.g., for-me-ness, ownership or agency).
With regard to the example of D.P., who experienced «double vi-
sions» in the sense of not immediately being able to recognize himself 
as the perceiver of objects, we suggest that this example too does not 
suggest something like an absence of for-me-ness. Rather, the example 
testifies precisely to the presence of for-me-ness. D.P.’s experience of not 
immediately being able to recognize himself as the perceiver of objects 
is still first-personally manifest to him. In fact, this experience is so 
distressing that he seeks medical help. Instead of lacking for-me-ness, it 
seems that for-me-ness here is disturbed in the sense that it does not au-
tomatically or unproblematically lead to reflective self-ascription of this 
particular kind of perceptual experience. This interpretation seems to 
be in line with the one suggested in the original study, where the authors 
concluded that the case of D.P. demonstrates «selective changes in the 
quality of the sense of self-ownership for perceptions of objects» [Zahn 
et al. 2008, 401]. In other words, the authors concluded that the sense of 
ownership or minimal self was affected or impaired but not completely 
lost in this patient.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that Lane operates with different con-
cepts of for-me-ness, mineness, and ownership than the authors he is 
criticizing (e.g., Zahavi). This is evident, when he argues that it is im-
portant not to conflate «hosting» a thought with «owning» a thought, and 
that «hosting» does not imply «ownership» [Lane 2012, 260] or when 
he states that «perspective does not determine mineness» [Lane 2012, 
258]. Here, Albahari’s distinction between different kinds of ownership 
might be helpful. In her book Analytical Buddhism: The Two-Tiered Il-
lusion of Self, she makes a distinction between “possessive ownership”, 
“personal ownership”, and “perspectival ownership” [Albahari 2006, 
53-54]. “Possessive ownership” concerns objects that are mine by social 
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conventions (e.g., the books in my bag); “personal ownership” is a mat-
ter to being thematically aware of oneself as the owner of an experience; 
and “perspectival ownership” refers to experiences being given to the 
subject of experience in a distinctive manner. While D.P. perhaps could 
be said to experience problems in the domain of “personal ownership” 
when perceiving objects, there is nothing to suggest that these problems 
also affects “perspectival ownership”. By contrast, D.P.’s experience of 
not immediately being able to recognize himself as the perceiver of 
objects is still given to him first-personally, i.e. in a manner that is dif-
ferent from how this experience can appear to anybody else. In other 
words, the epistemic asymmetry is here preserved and for-me-ness, as 
we have defined it, is not absent.
Finally, Millière’s claim that drug-induced altered states of con-
sciousness indicate a loss of minimal self-awareness can be refuted on 
similar grounds. Despite the remarkable character of these experience, 
they remain conscious, memorable, to some extent describable, and, 
most importantly in this particular context, characterized by for-me-
ness. They are first-personally manifest to the subject of experience and 
not to anybody else. Experiences of drug-induced ego-dissolution are 
to some degree reminiscent of certain mystical experiences [e.g., Stace 
1960] such as the oceanic feeling and the experience of undifferentiated 
unity (unio mystica) with the Absolute (e.g., God, emptiness [sunyata] 
or the universe). In the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, we find the follow-
ing illuminating description of such an experience: «as a lump of salt 
thrown into water melts away … even so, O Maitreyi, the individual 
soul, dissolved, is the Eternal – pure consciousness, infinite, transcen-
dent» [quoted in Stace 1960, 118]. The experience of the dissolution of 
the individual, finite self into infinitude is the very heart of the expe-
rience of unio mystica across mystical traditions [ibid.]. However, even 
these experiences remain characterized by their first-personal given-
ness, i.e. they also appear to the subject of experience in a way that 
they do not for anybody else [Zahavi 2011]. In cases of unio mystica, 
we have elsewhere argued that the minimal self is not lost but affected 
in a specific way [Parnas & Henriksen 2016]. We have also argued that 
the minimal self is neither intact nor lacking but disturbed in cases of 
thought insertion [Henriksen et al., in press].
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Finally, with regard to Millière’s reference to drug users’ tenden-
cy to avoid the first-person pronoun when describing their experi ences 
of ego dissolution, let us just add that patients with schizophrenia also 
sometimes may be tempted to avoid the first-person pronoun and in-
stead use third-person pronouns, e.g., “one is” or “it thinks” [Minkow-
ski 1927]. However, avoidance of the first-person pronoun or use of 
third-person pronouns are not evidence of a lost for-me-ness.
5. Conclusion
We have presented an account of for-me-ness, discussed alleged counter 
examples, and refuted them all. Thus, we maintain that for-me-ness is 
a necessary, ineliminable feature of phenomenal consciousness. Using 
Albahari’s distinction, we can say that perspectival ownership cannot 
be disowned or, in other words, that for-me-ness cannot lack, but it can 
be affected [e.g., Parnas & Henriksen 2016; Henriksen et al., in press]. 
In our view, much of the contemporary debate between advocates of 
for-me-ness and their opponents rests on how the concept of for-me-ness 
is defined by the authors using it. Unsurprisingly, different definitions 
lead to different conclusions about the status and role of for-me-ness in 
theories of phenomenal consciousness. Crucially, one cannot conclude 
from the fact that certain authors have used for-me-ness in their own 
specific way and presented examples of experiences, which apparently 
lack the kind of for-me-ness that they describe, that the universality of 
for-me-ness, as we, following Zahavi, define it, has been invalidated. 
The introductory reference to Hume and the brief discussion of whether 
or not his “no-self” claim could challenge the phenomenological claim 
of the existence of the minimal self was meant to illustrate this particu-
lar problem in the current scientific debate.
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Abstract
In contemporary consciousness studies, a central question concerns the nature 
of the most primitive and fundamental features of phenomenal consciousness. 
Some authors (e.g., Zahavi) have argued that for-me-ness (or minimal self-
hood) is a fundamental and necessary feature of phenomenal consciousness. 
The concept of for-me-ness articulates that experiences are first-personally 
manifest, i.e. they are always given to the subject of experience in a way in 
which they are not given to anybody else. Several authors have challenged 
this claim by presenting what they take to be counter examples, i.e. experi-
ences, which, in their view, lack for-me-ness, thereby seemingly rebutting the 
claim that for-me-ness is a necessary feature of phenomenal consciousness. 
In this study, (i) we present the account of for-me-ness, (ii) present three al-
leged counter examples that come from the domains of psychopathology and 
psychedelics, and (iii) critically discuss these examples and eventually refute 
them all. Thus, we maintain that for-me-ness is a necessary, ineliminable fea-
ture of phenomenal consciousness.
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